وعده نتانیاهو: «اجازه نخواهیم داد.»

RIAC :: RIAC, IRAS, FPI and NBM Hold a Round Table “Cooperation between Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria in the Context of the Regional Dynamics”

On October 18, 2023, a closed round table “Cooperation between Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria in the Context of Regional Dynamics” was held. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) in cooperation with Institute for Iran & Eurasia studies (IRAS), Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), and Nation Building Movement (NBM) organized the meeting. The goal of the round table was to discuss the dynamics of quadrilateral cooperation in the context of regional trends in the Middle East. The meeting was attended by leading experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria.

From the RIAC side, the meeting was attended by: Aleksandr Aksenenok, Vice-President, RIAC; Andrey Baklanov, Professor of the School of International Regional Studies of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University; Boris Dolgov, Leading Researcher at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS; Ibragim Ibragimov, Research Fellow at the Center for the Middle East Studies, IMEMO RAS; Alexei Khlebnikov, Independent Expert; Ivan Bocharov, Program Coordinator, RIAC.

RIAC :: Statehood in the Middle East: In Search of New Models

Regime changes in four Arab states (Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Algeria) were followed by protracted civil wars and humanitarian disasters unprecedented for the 21^st
century. The sharp drop in oil prices in 2014-2015 had severe socio-political implications for the entire region, especially for the Arab oil-importing countries, largely dependent on the distribution of oil super-profits. In 2018-2020, a new wave of mass protests swept across the region (in Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq and Sudan under the slogan of overthrowing the local rulers and elites – “all, means all”), then the COVID-19 pandemic switched into high gear, and natural disasters broke out. In other words, the region’s states have been under stress from a multitude of crises superimposed one upon another throughout the entire period.

With this background, the term “hassiya Arabiya” – “Arab singularity” – has become popular. For now, it is difficult to predict how this singularity may play out. Apparently, the content of this “peculiarity”, or separate identity, will still be a certain average model of illiberal democracy with a strong central authority, a kind of “new conservatism.” In the Arab public consciousness, this supreme, often charismatic, power is not perceived as autocratic.

A new external environment is also pushing the Middle East governments towards the search for their own development paths. Ideological centers of attraction, which existed in the bipolar world, have vanished. The nations of Eastern Europe had the experience of bourgeois-democratic development and are largely building their identity on their rejection of communism, perceiving the European Union as their guidepost. Yet, the European model does not fit the regional specifics too well. While the communist ideology has failed and the evolutionary model of the post-Soviet Russia has not yet produced an attractive alternative, the system of liberal democracy in the United States and the European Union has revealed serious flaws and institutional bottlenecks. Currently, most states in the Middle East are gravitating toward adaptive policies, as they try to avoid a one-sided orientation in the unfolding global confrontation. The recent trend towards new regional alliances, including normalization of relations with Israel, plays well into this context.

Nations in the Greater Middle East are willing to foster favorable conditions for solving their internal problems without foreign interference. From an object of geopolitics, it has turned into a serious actor that world powers have to reckon with.

Among Arab political scientists and politicians, much as in the circles of Middle East experts across the world, the political processes in a region that has seen multidirectional dynamics since 2011 continue to be hotly debated.

Academic terms such as “failed states”, “fragile states”, “dispensable states”, “deep state”, and others have become too common in the lexicon of political scientists. The flatness of these stock phrases raises legitimate questions, though. Especially if we take into account that the 30-year period from the late 1970s to the beginning of systemic upheavals after 2011 was a time of evolutionary development, with irreplaceable ruling elites consolidating their grip on power. The threat of large-scale hostilities at the interstate level was virtually eliminated. The development issues that had previously remained in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli conflict came to the fore. The front lines began to be drawn internally, with no due response elicited for quite some time. So those Arab leaders who failed to build a state capable of performing its basic functions, such as providing a decent standard of living for the majority of citizens, employment, equal access to education, health and social services, internal security – can be considered “failed” in a way.

Be that as it may, the Middle East is familiar with two approaches to reform, the Algerian and the Syrian ones. Algeria, under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid between 1979 and 1992, chose the path of unlimited political liberalization and gradual market reforms, which were certainly overdue. The one-party regime of the National Liberation Front was rapidly losing its social base to Islamist movements. But its transformation was haphazard by nature, akin to Gorbachev’s perestroika in the Soviet Union. In Syria, too, Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power inaugurated a period where the young president, heir to his great father, relaxed the rigid centralization of power, initiated economic reforms, opened channels of dialogue with the opposition and introduced limited civil liberties. This brief period of cultural and political activism, dubbed the “Damascus Spring,” did not last long (2001-2002). By 2005, the hardline of maintaining the status quo had prevailed among the Baath Party and security forces. No acceptable alternative to the hasty reforms had been proposed. As a result, both the Algerian and Syrian cases led to civil war and massive casualties. In Algeria, this time is referred to as the “black decade.”

In the meantime, the Arab world has made progress towards integration into the global economy, even though market reforms in most countries, where the public sector retained its dominant role, faced ubiquitous resistance from a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy, as well as rigid and archaic social structures. On the eve of the 2011 mass popular uprisings, the region demonstrated the highest economic growth rates and best macroeconomic indicators for the past three decades. It even outperformed many developing nations in South Asia and Tropical Africa, as regards the living standards, especially in urban areas. But all those remarkable achievements did not translate into a higher quality of life for much of the population.

The fruits of the reforms were mostly enjoyed by a narrow group of people from the circle of those in power, the state bureaucracy and the new oligarchy. With an outwardly democratic facade, authoritarian methods were conserved, acquiring an increasingly pronounced clan-based nepotistic character. In other words, the laws of domestic explosion started to work when the evolutionary path of development turned into authoritarian stability, backed by forceful methods and imitation of democratic institutions.

State-building and modernization of political systems had never been completed. Tribal, sectarian and inter-ethnic ties proved stronger than the national identity and civic identification with national interests.

And now the Greater Middle East, which has entered a protracted phase of restructuring, is under pressure from radical internal uncertainty and an unfavorable external environment. New and “old” rulers alike have to adapt to the rapid changes in the global balance of power.

The events of the recent decade, while heterogeneous across the board, have raised a number of serious questions about what lies ahead: the limits of democratization in the Arab world, centralization and decentralization, an outlook for new and old parties, organizations and movements, the possibility of inclusive governance, the role and place of “political Islam,” the extent to which resurfaced sectarian relations have an impact on politics, and the army’s role in the emerging political structures.

It is worth noting that assessments of this transformational period vary considerably in the world. At a closer look, three trains of analytical thought can be distinguished.

The first approach unequivocally suggests that the revolutions have not achieved the goals sought by millions of rebels, as the root causes have not been eliminated, which results in a situation that will sooner or later trigger new explosions. A “new authoritarianism” is rampant in the region, the institutional dominance of intelligence services is substituting modern-state governance, with corruption and nepotism flourishing amid growing social inequality and poor political representation. Trust in socio-political institutions is in a deep decline, especially among those under 30, whose total number is close to 70% of the population.

Such assessments are mainly characteristic of political scientists in the West who reflexively view the processes in the Arab world from an ideological angle, as a dichotomy of autocracies and democracies.

The second school is not so straightforward in their assessments. As it seeks to grasp the changes taking place, it focuses not so much on the characteristics of “failed states”, as rather on the extent to which states and societies in the Middle East have learned from the revolutionary changes, and on how to build a new social contract that ensures sustainable development. Nor do these scholars ignore the fact that reforms in societies, where regime change has occurred or civil conflicts persist, are limited by the objective capabilities of those nations. Countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, where external debt accounts for more than 80% of their GDP, are going through an acute financial crunch. Syria, where, according to the UN, more than 80% of citizenry live below the poverty line, is an even worse case. Too abrupt movements amid slowed growth and contracting financial investments by oil exporters are fraught with new social and political cataclysms.

The third camp is dominated by political scientists and experts who do not agree that pessimism is the easiest and most infallible way to explain dynamics in the Middle East. They are characterized by a more positive vision of the prospects for stable development, especially in the longer run, as generations change each other in natural succession. A process of national self-identification is gradually unfolding in the region. “Democratic illusions” are giving way to more down-to-earth approaches. Many Arab political analysts wonder whether “we are ready for democracy” and what development model may take root in the Arab East. All known regional models – Egyptian, Turkish, Saudi, Iranian – have been discredited. “Political Islam”, at the current stage, has failed and is in a state of critical self-analysis, even though it cannot be disregarded altogether. Advancement along the path of liberal democracy seems unlikely, especially after the political system imposed on Iraq has yielded an explosion of terrorism and a degradation of the very foundations of statehood. Democratic values in their Western sense do not fit the social psychology and political culture of Arab societies.

In view of choosing new or hybrid models, state-building in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf are certainly worthy of attention. Five years ago, with the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia embarked upon a path of structural reforms accompanied by a gradual replacement of religious ultra-conservatism with a moderate version of Islam, combined with local nationalism and openness to the outside world. Such policies, as follows from opinion polls, are in step with the sentiments of the youth majority in Saudi Arabia and the entire region.

In our opinion, consistent evolutionary top-to-bottom reforms are one of the options for development along the path toward a modernized system of public administration that encourages private entrepreneurship and allows for the traditional social system and structure to be retained. However, as the past shows, reformers who have chosen this path face dangerous challenges. The renewed Saudi state will have to walk a fine line between changing the terms of the social contract with a society accustomed to paternalism and the resistance of traditionalists and Islamic fundamentalists to any reforms.

Nations in the Greater Middle East are willing to foster favorable conditions for solving their internal problems without foreign interference. The significance of the hour is that the negative implications of the geopolitical confrontation in the 21^st century are acutely felt in the region. Dual military tensions in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific divert the world’s resources from development, spurring a new round of the arms race. Furthermore, the Middle East is no longer what it was two or three decades ago. From an object of geopolitics, it has turned into a serious actor that world powers have to reckon with.

Realistically assessing the capabilities of all regional players, Russia should be wise enough to assume that cultivating relations with the nations of the Middle East on anti-American grounds would unlikely have any realistic prospects, even if they reject the American jackboot. Their interests concur with those of the U.S. in various areas. The messianic plans of the Biden administration to create an “alliance of democracies” in the Middle East seem unfeasible, too. Understanding this would make it much easier for Russia and the major regional players – Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia – to make their constructive contribution to the solution of global problems.

RIAC :: Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Last Chapter or More to Come?

The unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) has declared its self-liquidation. A respective decree was signed by Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of this de facto entity. “It has been decided to disband all state institutions as well as bodies under departmental subordination until January 1, 2024,” the document reads. And while NKR is a self-proclaimed republic, whose independence has not been recognized by any nation, including Armenia, the very style of this self-liquidation decree is painfully reminiscent of the famous Belovezha Accords.

In both the former and the latter cases, the document is the consequence rather than the cause of complex ethno-political and international processes. Nagorno-Karabakh was one of the triggers of the Soviet collapse, while the referendum on the NKR formation took place two days after the meeting in Viskuli, which not only put an end to the Soviet Union, but also changed the world.

Self-dissolution of an unrecognized republic can hardly be seen as a significant event that fundamentally changes the international agenda. But the situation in the Caucasus is undergoing serious changes right before our eyes, with consequences certainly extending far beyond the framework of this chronic ethno-political conflict.

Russia is extremely interested in unblocking transport communications and a peace treaty through its decisive mediation. But Turkey (which today feels itself a beneficiary in the Caucasus) benefits from the “corridor logic”, which will connect not only Nakhichevan with the regions of western Azerbaijan, but also the two Turkic allied countries. Of course, Ankara and Baku would prefer a corridor that would pass through today’s Armenian territory, but without Yerevan’s effective control (the question of formulas is secondary here).

Not only the Armenian leadership but Iran, too, do not agree with this approach, because Iran fears robust pan-Turkism along its own borders. Hence Tehran’s growing interest in what transpires in southern Armenia. The Islamic Republic does not recognize self-proclaimed entities (this applies not only to the NKR, but also to Abkhazia and South Ossetia). However, it does not need extraterritorial corridors on Armenian soil, especially since these are put in place under pressure from Ankara and Baku.

The agenda of the peace treaty is not so simple either. Formally, Russia and the West have no fundamental disagreements on this issue as Moscow, Brussels and Washington support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. However, after the SMO in Ukraine, the OSCE Minsk Group stopped operations and the unique interaction on the Karabakh track ceased. Now, Russia and the West see each other as rivals, while the peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan is looked upon as a means to minimize each other’s influence in the Caucasus region.

And last but not least, Azerbaijan solved the Karabakh problem by force, not at the negotiating table. One can find thousands of arguments in favor of the premise that the Armenian side had been shirking concessions, merely imitating the negotiation process for many years. But the fact remains that brute force prevailed. This opens horizons for new demands on Baku’s part, whereas Yerevan suffered dangerous traumas and their treatment is accompanied by high risks and unpredictability. Thus, in case of any change in the military and political balance, there is a risk of revision or even breaking of the new status quo, if not by the parties to the conflict directly, then by some external actors.

The unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) has declared its self-liquidation. A respective decree was signed by Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of this de facto entity. “It has been decided to disband all state institutions as well as bodies under departmental subordination until January 1, 2024,” the document reads. And while NKR is a self-proclaimed republic, whose independence has not been recognized by any nation, including Armenia, the very style of this self-liquidation decree is painfully reminiscent of the famous Belovezha Accords.

Conflict genesis

The breakdown of the regional status quo in the Caucasus is associated with the September 2023 escalation. In the course of the third Karabakh war (and the shortest, as it lasted two incomplete days), Azerbaijan achieved the strategic goal it had set in the latter days of the unified Soviet state, which is restoring its territorial integrity. However, while recognizing the obvious importance of this event, one should not reduce the analysis of the current state and future trajectories of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Baku’s successful blitzkrieg.

Fernand Braudel, a famous French historian and a prominent representative of the Annals school, proposed three categories of time for researchers: “long duration” (one century and more), “cyclic (opportunistic) time” (a range of up to 50 years) and “time of events” (focusing on today’s problems) [1]. To get a holistic view of the dynamics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and, most importantly, to understand the prospects for its resolution, it is necessary to refer not only to “hot” facts relevant “here and now”, but also to the historical events that go back at least to the previous century and a half, which still determine today’s agenda.

Take, for example, the topic of the so-called “Western Zangezur.” Back in 2021, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev said: “Western Zangezur is currently under Armenian control. But due to the Zangezur corridor that was carved out, we’d certainly use it to return our citizens to the land of their ancestors.” On September 25, 2023, while receiving his ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the city of Nakhichevan, Aliyev declared that this exclave was “the ancient edge of Azerbaijan,” separated from the main part of the country by the Soviets. Hence the need to restore the broken justice.

It has become a kind of conventional wisdom to speak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as a peculiar trigger for the collapse of the USSR. Indeed, the conflict showed the inability of the Soviet leadership to prevent ethno-territorial disputes as well as effectively extinguish the resulting fires. After the Regional Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijani SSR petitioned Moscow, Baku and Yerevan on February 20, 1988 to revise its status and incorporate it into the Armenian SSR, the party and Soviet structures were unable to propose a clear strategy for overcoming the crisis, constantly oscillating between three options: direct control from the center, self-determination of the autonomy and the integrity of the AzSSR. As a result, the intra-state conflict turned into an interstate confrontation involving various external actors (Russia, Iran, Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union).

However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict had its own logic and dynamics. And it would be wrong to consider it only as one of the factors (albeit an important one) of the Soviet collapse. The appeal as of February 20, 1988 did not arise out of nothing. It was based on the traditions of ethno-political confrontation, manifested at least since late 19th century, when nationalist ideas had penetrated the South Caucasus.

It is not quite correct to refer to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict either. Indeed, for the past 35 years Karabakh has been at the heart of this confrontation, and the post-Soviet identities of Armenians and Azerbaijanians were developing through a struggle over this tiny piece of land. But, at different times, conflicts between the two peoples or ethnicities would flare up in Baku, Zangezur, Nakhichevan, and even in the territory of modern Georgia, i.e., outside Nagorno-Karabakh. This was the case in the Russian Empire, in the late Soviet times, and after the collapse of the USSR [2]. Just to remind: the trigger for the second Karabakh war was the clashes in July 2020 on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border about 200 km off the hotbed of the conflict in NKR.

Fighting for land and “coincidence”

The main content of these disputes was (and still is) what Ernest Gellner described as the “overlapping” of ethnic and political units [3]. Taking into account the fact that Armenians and Azerbaijanis had, at the turn of the last two centuries, areas of settlement different from the current ones, generally did not live compactly but were interspersed, the struggle for “coincidence” had a wide geography and took place with the intervention of external players. The Turkish, American or French factor in Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Zangezur did not emerge with the appearance of the political figures like Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Joseph Biden or Emmanuel Macron.

The long-lasting Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has traditionally been fueled by the maximalist aspirations of the two sides. Their national projects presupposed exclusivity rather than inclusivity, the dominance of one ethnic group rather than their co-existence. This was de facto a matter of establishing “ethnic ownership” of land, its scarcity turning the territorial resource into a crucial factor. During the conflicts of 1918-1920, 1988-1994, and 2020-2023, both Baku and Yerevan sought to secure and consolidate territorial gains. The Armenian side described this thrust as ensuring a “security belt”, while the Azerbaijani side addressed to it as caring for the “corridor”.

It would suffice to review all the key initiatives on this conflict resolution, be they discussions at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 or the proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group between 1997 and 2020 (“the package approach”, “step-by-step” plans, “common state”, “Madrid Principles” and their various updated modifications), to see that the peace initiatives were mainly put forward by third parties rather than the sides to this ethno-political standoff. Against this background, the proposals of the first Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan emerge as a unique example of pragmatism and readiness for concessions and compromises. But these are so interesting exactly because they are exceptions to the general rule!

Conflict pendulum

What has been the pattern for the pendulum of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict that sometimes led to radical changes in the status quo in South Caucasus? First of all, escalations occurred whenever an intra-state conflict would turn into an inter-state one. This was the case during the fall of the Russian Empire in 1918 and during the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Second, the status quo was ensured by the military-political balance of power, which combined the correlated potentials of the opposing parties and external actors. As soon as this fragile balance was to be disturbed, negotiations and diplomatic visits were replaced by renewed hostilities. In 2020 and 2023, Baku raised the stakes, clearly aware of the window of opportunities. The matter regards Moscow refocusing to other directions (Belarus in 2020 and Ukraine after 2022), the EU and the U.S. being interested in co-operation with Azerbaijan as an important energy partner, and Turkey’s growing potential in Eurasia. The mounting contradictions between Russia and the West were also taken into account, which made it impossible for the leaders of the global community to reach any consensus on the conflict resolution.

The path to September 2023 was largely programmed by the contradictory outcomes of the second Karabakh war three years ago. On the one hand, the status quo that had existed for 26 years was shattered at the end of the hostilities. Azerbaijan established its control not only over the seven districts occupied by Armenian forces in 1992-1994, but also reclaimed a significant part of the former NKAO, including the second largest city in this territory called Shusha, along with villages in the Hadrut, Mardakert and Martuni districts. By the beginning of 2021, the total size of land under the control of the unrecognized NKR had decreased fourfold. After the 2020 war, the line of contact between the conflicting sides became longer and more flexible. Since then, the positions of the opponents have been only 30-10 meters apart, whereas the warring parties were separated by hundreds of meters two years ago. Armenia, having lost its so-called “security belt”, gained a new section of the state border with Azerbaijan in the southern regions of Syunik and Gegharkunik.

But, on the other hand, Azerbaijan did not gain a decisive military victory. Its troops were stopped not far from Stepanakert, the capital of the unrecognized NKR. There was no symbolic capture of the last frontier of the Armenian defenses in Karabakh. The infrastructure of the de facto entity, albeit in a territorially reduced form, had been preserved. Financially and economically, it is still supported by Armenia. Moreover, at the end of the second Karabakh war, Armenian armed units were not completely withdrawn from the territory of the unrecognized NKR. The authorities (president, parliament, government), the army and the police of Nagorno-Karabakh continued to function, and even in September 2023 (sic!) the NKR parliament elected a new president, Samvel Shahramanyan, whose signature will now be forever associated with self-liquidation of the unrecognized republic. Be that as it may, foreign politicians visited Karabakh in 2020-2022 (French presidential candidate Valerie Pecresse), and famous billionaire and philanthropist Ruben Vardanyan even heading the republican government for some time.

Yet, Azerbaijan was not ready to accept this new “freezing of the conflict” and, starting in 2021, it began to implement “salami tactics” in relation to Karabakh, cutting off important security and communication nodes from this territory step by step (blocking the Lachin corridor, evacuating Armenian villages around this regional center). The lack of sufficient resources inside the country and outside support forced Yerevan to pursue a policy of geopolitical minimalism. As a result, before September 2023, the Armenian authorities had already recognized Baku’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. The last straw was surely Nikol Pashinyan’s idea of “providing international guarantees” for the Karabakh Armenian community. The military escalation of September 19-20, 2023 broke those arrangements as well.

End of history or a new chapter?

Does Karabakh’s self-liquidation mean the end of the conflict? Is the long-awaited peace close at hand? I’d like to give unambiguously positive answers to these questions. But there are some subtle aspects which call for special consideration.

At this point, let’s get back to our initial proposition about defining the conflict as Armenian-Azerbaijani, rather than Nagorno-Karabakh per se. Alongside the status of the NKR, which has finally been removed from the agenda, there is the issue of the exclaves (formally former territories of the Azerbaijani SSR and the Armenian SSR, which in their time found themselves de facto within “foreign republics”). In addition, the issue of demarcation and delimitation of the state border has not been resolved, as it was addressed only during special negotiations.

It should be noted that Azerbaijani forces had already moved deep into Armenia in 2021 in the Sotq-Khoznavar section, covering an area of about 5,400 hectares. Subsequently, a checkpoint was set up there to carry out customs and border control. And, of course, the issue of the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, which had been in “dormant mode” until 2020, but after the change of the military-political status quo reemerged once again, is far from being settled.

Meanwhile, all these issues, alongside the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem, affect the interests of other parties. Russia is extremely interested in unblocking transport communications and a peace treaty through its decisive mediation. But Turkey (which today feels itself a beneficiary in the Caucasus) benefits from the “corridor logic”, which will connect not only Nakhichevan with the regions of western Azerbaijan, but also the two Turkic allied countries. Of course, Ankara and Baku would prefer a corridor that would pass through today’s Armenian territory, but without Yerevan’s effective control (the question of formulas is secondary here).

Reference List

1. Braudel F. History and Social Sciences. Long Duration // Philosophy and Methodology of History. Ed. I.S. Kon. M., Progress, 1977. – p. 115-143.

2. Markedonov S.M. Transformation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Historical Experience and Modern State // World Economy and International Relations. 2022, vol. 66 – No. 12, p. 120-130

3. Gellner E. Nations and Nationalism. M., Progress, 1991, 127 pages

Opinion | New Trump indictment shows he didn't learn lesson of Watergate - The Washington Post - The Washington Post

If the allegations in the latest indictment of Donald Trump hold up, the former president is a common criminal — and an uncommonly stupid one.

Everyone knows, as the Watergate scandal drove home: The coverup is always worse than the crime. Everyone, that is, but Trump.

According to the superseding indictment handed up late Thursday, even after Trump knew the FBI was onto his improper retention of classified information, and even after he knew they were seeking security camera footage from the Mar-a-Lago storage areas where the material was kept — in other words, when any reasonably adept criminal would have known to stop digging holes — Trump made matters infinitely worse.

The alleged conduct — yes, even after all these years of watching Trump flagrantly flout norms — is nothing short of jaw-dropping: Trump allegedly conspired with others to destroy evidence.

As set out in the indictment’s relentlessly damning timeline, Trump enlisted his personal aide, Waltine Nauta, and a Mar-a-Lago worker, Carlos De Oliveira, in a conspiracy to delete the subpoenaed footage.

Consider: According to the indictment, on June 22, 2022, the Justice Department emailed to a Trump lawyer a draft grand jury subpoena for security camera footage. The next day, the former president called De Oliveira — who has reportedly worked for Trump for almost two decades — “and they spoke for approximately 24 minutes.” Hard to imagine what that might have been about.

After that, the pace picked up. Nauta claiming a “family emergency,” changed plans to accompany Trump to Illinois and made a secret trip to Florida, where he met up with De Oliveira. On June 27, 2022, De Oliveira met with another Trump employee, and, after saying the conversation should “remain between the two of them,” asked how many days the server retained video footage — and advised him that “the boss” wanted the server deleted.

“Trump Employee 4 responded that he would not know how to do that, and that he did not believe that he would have the rights to do that,” the indictment relates. De Oliveira “then insisted to TRUMP Employee 4 that ‘the boss’ wanted the server deleted and asked, ‘what are we going to do?’”

And then: “At 3:55 p.m., TRUMP called DE OLIVEIRA and they spoke for approximately three and a half minutes.”

That isn’t all. On August 26, 2022, two weeks after the FBI seized classified documents at Mar-a-Lago, Nauta called another Trump employee “and said words to the effect of, ‘someone just wants to make sure Carlos is good.’” The employee reassured Nauta that De Oliveira “would not do anything to affect his relationship” with Trump. “That same day,” the indictment states, Trump called De Oliveira and assured him that Trump would get him a lawyer.

Even before this new evidence, the allegations of obstruction lodged against Trump were already damning. “Wouldn’t it be better if we just told them we don’t have anything here?” Trump allegedly asked his lawyer — after the documents were subpoenaed. He tried to get the lawyer to deep-six any problematic documents. As the lawyer recalled, “He made a funny motion as though — well okay why don’t you take them with you to your hotel room and if there’s anything really bad in there, like, you know, pluck it out.”

But this — the alleged conspiracy to destroy the security footage — is the epitome of obstruction, stunning in its brazenness.

There is an argument, depressing but not unreasonable, that none of this matters, legally or in the court of public opinion. The unlawful retention of documents and obstruction case against Trump appeared strong when they were first made public more than a month ago. And the new Mar-a-Lago charges are unrelated to the impending indictment of Trump for his efforts to undo the results of the 2020 election.

Those who insist on seeing Trump as the beleaguered victim of partisan prosecutors will not be moved by the fact of his 24-minute chat with a longtime retainer. The rest of us have long understood who he is. These new charges simply add to the pile.

But drip by drip, count by count, obstructive act by obstructive act, the seriousness of this situation comes into focus, the stakes of the next election become clearer. Trump in office was willing to do whatever it took to remain in power. Trump out of office was willing to do whatever it took to keep “my boxes.” One demonstration of narcissistic entitlement bolsters the other and deepens the urgency of holding this man to account, once and for all, and for all that he has done.

وعده نتانیاهو: «اجازه نخواهیم داد.»

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ایران پس از آیت‌الله خامنه‌ای

Conflict genesis

Fighting for land and “coincidence”

Conflict pendulum

End of history or a new chapter?

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